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News Reports:
Shia crescent pierces heart of Arab world - Times
[ Shiites firmly establised in traditional Sunni areas of influence]
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The Times - 17 July 2006
SHIA CRESCENT PIERCES HEART OF THE ARAB WORLD
Sunni governments are nervously eyeing a militant alliance capable of taking on Israel
By Nicholas Blanford
THE present conflict between Hezbollah and Israel is not just a local quarrel between bitter foes who have been fighting each other in southern Lebanon for a quarter of a century. It is an attempt to redefine the balance of power in the Middle East.
As such it has implications not only for Israel but also for the Western-friendly, Sunni-led Arab states such as Saudi Arabia, Egypt and Jordan.
The stakes are enormous. By attacking Haifa, Hezbollah has transferred the conflict to Israeli territory, undermining the latter’s longstanding military doctrine of defeating its enemies on foreign soil.
“If the Israeli public begins clamouring for a ceasefire, then the Israeli army will have been neutralised,” Amal SaadGhorayeb, a Lebanese expert on Hezbollah, said. “It will shatter the myth of Israeli invincibility.”
Sheikh Hassan Nasrallah, the leader of Hezbollah, appeared on television yesterday to warn Israel that the guerrillas’ military capabilities remained strong and that “we are still at the beginning” of the conflict.
“Our fighters are still there and they love the confrontation,” he said. “They are looking to show the world a new vision of victory.”
Such defiance may dismay Israelis, but it will cause additional unease among Sunni Arab countries who view the conflagration as a naked attempt by Shia-dominated Iran to project itself into the heart of the Arab world. Saudi Arabia hinted at this irritation with Hezbollah and its patron in an unusually frank statement that came after the kidnapping of two Israeli soldiers last week. It called the operation an “irresponsible action” and blamed elements in Lebanon “and those behind them”.
Recent months have seen the crystallisation of an anti-Western alliance linking Iran, under the hardline President Ahmadinejad, some Shia factions in Iraq, Syria — which is ruled by the Alawites, a Shia splinter group — Hezbollah and the Damascus branch of the Hamas movement.
In December 2004 King Abdullah of Jordan famously described this emerging alliance as a “Shia crescent”, a synonym that outraged Tehran but spoke tellingly of Sunni Arab fears about the ambitions of Iran to become a regional superpower capable of facing up to Israel. Although the inclusion of the Sunni Hamas movement in the alliance weakens the notion of a Shia crescent, the idea is not entirely fanciful.
Emboldened by this partnership, Iran and Syria have refused to yield to intense international pressure to comply with the demands of the West on several issues. Syria stands accused by many of assassinating Rafik Hariri, the former Lebanese Prime Minister, last year, as well as continuing to support antiIsraeli militants and insurgency groups in Iraq. The Iranians faces possible UN sanctions if they continus to pursue their nuclear ambitions.
But Tehran, Damascus and their Hamas and Hezbollah allies are calculating that the United States, bogged down in the turmoil in Iraq, is unable to back its demands by force, allowing them to play some high-stakes poker, including the current confrontation with Israel. Iran increased the pressure yesterday by raising the spectre of a regional war, saying that Israel would suffer “unimaginable losses” if it attacked Syria. In turn, Mohsen Bilal, the Syrian Information Minister, vowed a “firm and direct response not limited in time or means” if Syria is attacked.
What worries the rulers of Sunni Arab countries is that, as their citizens watch satellite television images of the destruction wrought by Israel on Lebanon, sympathy will grow for Hezbollah, regarded by many Arabs — Sunni and Shia alike — as the only credible political and military force willing to match words with actions by taking on the might of Israel’s military force.
Perhaps that is why President Mubarak of Egypt, who has little taste for Hezbollah, admitted yesterday that “Israel will not be victorious in the current conflict”. He said: “Israel should stop the killing of defenceless Lebanese civilians.”
RELIGIOUS DIVIDE
IRAN 89% Shia 9% Sunni
PALESTINIANS 5% Shia 90% Sunni
IRAQ 65% Shia 20% Sunni
LEBANON 40% Shia 20% Sunni
SYRIA 15% Shia 74% Sunni
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10 Oct 2010
Cresecent over Iraq
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News Reports:
Iraq, Iran and the New Shiite Crescent - American Chronicle
Arabs Fear Rising Shiite Power in Iraq - FOX NEWS
'Shiite Giant' Extends Its Reach - Washington Post
[ Iraq succumbs to Shiites. Iran influence now extends to other Arab nations.]
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AMERICAN CHRONICLE - January 08, 2007
IRAQ, IRAN AND THE NEW SHIITE CRESCENT
By Greg Reeson
Even before the rise of the post-Saddam government in Iraq, Sunni leaders in Egypt and Jordan warned of a “Shiite Crescent,” a zone of influence and power by Islam’s second largest branch that stretched across the Middle East from Beirut to Tehran. The push for Shiite dominance, which has been led by an increasingly bold and defiant regime in Iran, is making Sunni Arabs in the region gradually more nervous, and with good reason.
Shiites, who represent less than twenty percent of all the world’s Muslims, have long been subject to Sunni dominated regimes throughout most of the Middle East. Prior to the U.S.-led invasion of Iraq in 2003, Iran was the only country with a Shiite majority population and a Shiite-led government. With the toppling of Saddam Hussein’s Sunni minority dictatorship, Iraq (which is sixty percent Shiite) is now led, albeit tenuously, by a Shiite-dominated unity government that, when combined with an aggressive regional power play by Iran, has emboldened Shiites in Sunni-led countries.
Iran’s Shiite regime has been fomenting unrest in Iraq since the very beginning of the war in early 2003. Wielding significant influence among Iraq’s Shia in the south, Iran has provided weapons, fighters, and training for militias conducting attacks against coalition forces and Sunni insurgents. Iran’s hand can be felt in everything in Iraq from the explosive materials contained in IEDs to the sectarian violence waged by private militaries like Shiite cleric Moqtada al-Sadr’s Mehdi Army. The ultimate goal, of course, is to forge an Iraq that is at best completely dominated by Iran, or at worst openly friendly toward Iraq’s former foe.
In Bahrain, which is seventy percent Shiite, a Sunni minority regime has been increasingly under fire from a discontented populace demanding better living conditions and increased representation in government. Iran has close ties to Shiites throughout the region and regularly uses its influence to inflame Shiite passions when it suits Tehran’s needs. The Shiites in Bahrain have witnessed the events unfolding in Iraq and are now moving to make their voices heard.
In Lebanon, which is governed by a coalition of Sunnis, Shiites, and Christians, Hezbollah is leading massive protests that demand Shiite power equivalent to their proportion of the population (with about a third of the population, the Shia are the largest single group in Lebanon). Emboldened by a remarkable performance against the Israeli military during the most recent conflict last summer, Iranian sponsored Hezbollah is waging a proxy war against the Jewish State while increasing its popularity among Lebanon’s Shiites.
And while some include Syria in the Shiite Crescent, Assad’s dictatorship is actually Alawite, a sect of Islam that promotes pan-Arabism and is not ideologically aligned with the Shia. Still, Syria is openly allied with the clerics in Iran and serves as a launch pad for Iranian arms and fighters headed for Lebanon.
With Iranian influence spreading throughout the Middle East, countries like Saudi Arabia, Egypt and Jordan, all with strong Shiite minorities, are becoming increasingly nervous at the prospect of rising Shiite power in a region traditionally dominated by Sunni Arabs. They fear tensions with their own Shiite populations and some, like Saudi Arabia, have openly hinted that intervention in Iraq on behalf of Sunnis is a realistic possibility to stop the spread of Iranian influence.
Iran, in its quest to become the most powerful nation in the Middle East, has led the push for increased Shiite influence throughout the region. Shiites in Bahrain and Lebanon have watched the consolidation of power in Iraq and begun to assert themselves politically against governments that are not representative of their populations. Sunnis are nervous, and rightfully so. If Iran succeeds in acquiring a nuclear weapon, the fear of a Shiite Crescent will be eclipsed by the reality of a Shiite dominance of the Middle East that will persevere for generations.
Greg Reeson is a Senior Writer for GOPUSA and a Featured Writer for The New Media Journal and The Veteran's Voice. He is the author of the forthcoming "Persistent Conflict: Redefining the War on Terror," due out in 2009.
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FOX NEWS - April 24, 2003
Arabs Fear Rising Shiite Power in Iraq
CAIRO, Egypt
The new assertiveness of Iraq's Shiite Muslim majority has raised worries elsewhere in the mostly Sunni Muslim Middle East, where governments fear the rise of an Iranian-style theocracy, unrest at home and revived tensions within the family of Islam.
Saudi Arabia, with its own significant Shiite population, may feel among the most threatened by events in Iraq, its neighbor to the north. But even farther afield in places like Egypt, there is concern about what is seen as Shiite restiveness.
"Now the game is how to contain it," Egyptian political scientist Gehad Auda said.
Sunnis are by far the majority of the world's more than 1 billion Muslims, but in Iraq they make up only about a third of the 24 million people. Most of the rest are Shiite.
Saddam Hussein's regime was dominated by Sunnis. Now that his regime has been toppled by U.S. and British forces, Shiites are bursting forth to make clear they expect more say in Iraq's political future.
This week, an annual ritual that was repressed by Saddam's regime became a display of Shiite power as hundreds of thousands made a pilgrimage to the central Iraqi city of Karbala to commemorate the 7th century martyrdom of the Prophet Muhammad's grandson Hussein. While performing the ritual, many pilgrims shouted anti-U.S. as well as anti-Saddam slogans.
"The end of Saddam the tyrant has awakened the Shiite giant in Iraq," Saudi political analyst Khaled bin Sulaiman al-Sulaiman said Wednesday.
Auda predicted that nations in Iraq's neighborhood would try to slow political reforms the United States envisions that could result in Iraqi Shiites voting themselves into power.
"Democracy wouldn't serve the purpose of containment," Auda said.
He expects Saudi Arabia to work with countries like Egypt, whose status as the largest Arab country and a key U.S. ally gives it political muscle in the region, to try put its own stamp on Iraq's future.
Egypt's government may feel it has to act to calm Sunni fundamentalists, a growing political force in Egypt, Auda said. Sunni fundamentalists are deeply suspicious of Shiites.
In Egypt, where Shiite traditions are largely unknown, bloody television and newspaper images this week of Iraqi Shiites slashing their bodies and crying out in a stylized display of mourning for Hussein were viewed by many with baffled distaste.
Shiites are more visible in Saudi Arabia, making up 10 to 15 percent of the kingdom's roughly 19 million people, but they complain of restrictions on their freedom of expression, inability to advance in government jobs and other discrimination. The divide is deepened by a puritanical Sunni code in Saudi Arabia that shuns not only other religions but also other Muslim sects.
In the 1980s, Saudi Arabia was convinced that mostly Shiite Iran planned to spread its 1979 Islamic revolution and exploit the complaints of Saudi Shiites. The kingdom and other Arab states supported Saddam in his 1980-88 war with Iran.
In 1988, Saudi Arabia broke relations with Iran, accusing it of supporting terrorism and subversion. Relations were restored shortly after the 1991 Gulf War, but suspicions are being revived now that Iran is seen as meddling in Iraq, its neighbor to the west.
Islam has been divided into the orthodox Sunni and minority Shiite sects since soon after the death of the Prophet Muhammad in 632. Sunnis accepted Abu Bakr, a respected contemporary of the prophet, to lead what was then an international political as well as spiritual empire.
A small group, the "shi'at Ali," or party of Ali, followed the much younger Ali, Muhammad's cousin and son-and-law.
In one 7th century battle rooted in the dispute, Hussein, Ali's son, was killed by Sunni rivals on the plains of Karbala in what is now Iraq.
The bloodshed has continued even in modern times.
Sunni, Shiite and Christian militias all fought each other during Lebanon's 1975-90 civil war. In the Gulf state of Bahrain, where Shiites are a slight majority but the ruling family is Sunni, Shiites staged a violent campaign for political reform in the 1990s, triggering a government crackdown.
Lebanon's war ended when a power-sharing deal was struck under which the president is always Maronite Catholic, the prime minister Sunni Muslim, and the speaker of parliament Shiite Muslim. Calm came to Bahrain when the emir bowed to demands for more democracy that gave Shiites a say in politics.
The Bahraini and Lebanese examples showed that the Sunni-Shiite rivalry can be peacefully resolved. Ali Fakhro, a former Bahraini minister of education and a Sunni, said he believed all Iraqis understand that if they fought each other, the U.S. and British troops that ousted Saddam would linger, denying Iraq its independence.
"I think both Sunnis and Shiites realize these cards should not be given to the American occupiers for the exploitation of Iraq," he said. "I have great faith in the Iraqi people and I think its time they are allowed to decide their own fate and live united."
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Iraq's Rising Power
'Shiite Giant' Extends Its Reach
THE WASHINGTON POST - August 24, 2006
Sadr's Armed Movement Becomes Pivotal Force in Fractured Country
KUFA, Iraq.
Pumping their fists in the air, the men and boys inside the colonnaded mosque shouted their loyalty to Shiite Muslim leader Moqtada al-Sadr. "Hasten the coming of the Mahdi!" thousands chanted in the baking sun of the open-air mosque, summoning the central religious figure of Sadr's movement. "And curse his enemies!"
Booming loudspeakers outside the mosque echoed the devotion of Sadr's followers converging for Friday prayers last month in Kufa, the cleric's spiritual base outside the Shiite holy city of Najaf. "Moqtada! Moqtada!" martial male voices intoned over the loudspeakers in rhythmic cadence with the footsteps of the gathering worshipers. "Even the child in the mother's cradle cries: 'Moqtada! Moqtada!' "
Sadr's followers answer as one when his movement calls them, and his organization of social, religious, political and military programs -- as well as the young clerics, politicians and fighters around him -- has become the most pivotal force in Iraq after the United States.
Millions of Sadr's supporters turned out in December elections to give his movement the largest bloc in parliament, which in turn put him in control of four government ministries. Thousands of male followers abandoned their homes and jobs when a bomb destroyed a Shiite shrine in Samarra on Feb. 22, rallying at Sadr headquarters on a night and day of retaliatory bloodletting that plunged Iraq into sectarian war.
While opposition to the U.S. military presence in Iraq remains one of its core tenets, the Sadr movement's militia, called the Mahdi Army, took heavy casualties in two military uprisings against better-armed, better-trained U.S. forces in 2004. Today, according to Sadr leaders and outside analysts, the movement is husbanding its strength and waiting for American troops to go.
Sadr "clearly is the most potent political figure, and the most popular one," in Iraq, said Joost Hiltermann, Middle East project director for the Brussels-based International Crisis Group. "Unless directly provoked, Sadrists will lay low, because they know the Americans' time in Iraq is coming to an end," he said. "Why would they risk another major loss of fighters if it's not necessary? Americans in their eyes are already defeated -- they're going to leave."
In the plainly furnished front room of his simple house in Najaf, one of Sadr's top aides agreed.
"The first time the Sadr trend fought them, it was forced on us," said Riyadh al-Nouri, a brother-in-law of Sadr's, reflecting the movement's belief that American military and civilian leaders provoked the confrontations with the cleric's followers in 2004. "We had no choice. Sayyid Moqtada didn't want to fight," Nouri said, using a religious honorific for Sadr. "This time, it might be the people who are mad and upset who would do this again. But as of now, in terms of orders from the Sadr trend, it doesn't call for these things."
"Until now, the Shiite giant has not begun to move. But if things come to a dead end," Nouri added, Shiite religious authorities "could take a decision to move him. It depends on them."
"Until now, they have patience," Nouri said.
Building a Movement
The movement that Sadr now leads took shape in the seminaries of Najaf, a theological center of the Shiite world, as clerics in the second half of the 20th century sought to counter what were then growing secular and nationalist movements in the Arab world. Sadr's own work since the U.S.-led invasion builds upon the social and health programs for Shiite poor begun by his father, Grand Ayatollah Mohammed Sadiq al-Sadr, in the 1990s. Sadr's father died with two of his sons in 1999, in an assassination believed to have been ordered by Iraqi President Saddam Hussein.
The Sadr movement's ultimate goal is a "united Islamic state," Bahaa al-Araji, a senior lawmaker in the Sadr political bloc, said in an interview. In Baghdad's Sadr City and other areas under Sadr's control, women uniformly cover their hair with scarves in the style of conservative Muslims. Islamic scholars operating with Sadr's office help arbitrate divorces, inheritances and other social matters in accordance with religious law. And fighters claiming to be part of Sadr's Mahdi Army -- named for a figure some Muslims believe will usher in an era of justice and true belief just before the end of time -- enforce a stringent Islamic code that includes the prohibition of alcohol and help enforce the orders of extrajudicial Islamic courts.
The movement is highly structured, largely along the lines of the Lebanese Hezbollah organization, building for its followers a state within a state while also acquiring a share of power in Iraq's formal government. Sadr, like Hezbollah, built popularity in part by providing social services such as health care. Because he controls the Health Ministry, and with it the hospitals and clinics of Iraq, his followers bear their children in public hospitals decorated with posters of the young cleric. They go to their graves washed by workers of a Sadr charity at a sprawling Shiite cemetery in Najaf, at a cost of 5,000 dinars, about $3.40, one-fifteenth of what grieving families outside Sadr's network pay. Sadr also sponsors the God's Martyr Foundation, which supports veterans and the families of fighters who are killed.
Under a tithing system followed by Sadr's movement and many other mainstream Shiite groups, those who are financially capable give one-fifth of their income, capital investments or both to their religious leaders.
At Sadr's busy headquarters in Najaf last month, a steady stream of men poured in to sign up for a Sadr recruitment drive in the name of rebuilding the Samarra shrine. Younger men offered their labor. Other followers offered cash, including a proud grandfather who prodded forward a toddling grandson clutching two crisp U.S. $5 bills.
Describing the method of building Sadr's organization, Araji said, "We now see resistance should be political, and not military."
Avoiding Confrontation
Sadr's relationship with the occupying U.S. forces has been hostile, and at times violent. In early 2004, L. Paul Bremer, then the top U.S. administrator in Iraq, declared Sadr an "outlaw." Bremer's spokesmen announced a murder warrant accusing Sadr in the stabbing death of a fellow Shiite cleric. Sadr's forces battled against the U.S. military in Sadr City, Najaf and across the south that year. But in elections in 2005, Sadr's movement participated in the political process and, along with other Shiite parties, claimed power and became part of the government.
Today, Sadr's movement remains wary of the U.S. forces now trying to impose order on chaotic Baghdad. Mahdi Army fighters openly operate checkpoints in Sadr City and elsewhere, standing at intersections and positioning themselves between two lanes of traffic on Sadr turf, scanning each car for strangers. They have sometimes taken Sunni Arab men away for detention or execution, according to Sunni witnesses. But they hide their weapons from American eyes, tucking pistols in waistbands under their shirts or hiding automatic rifles behind doorways.
When U.S. patrols roll into Sadr City, Mahdi Army patrols melt away. Last month, as Capt. Troy Wayman, one of the commanders of the tiny U.S. force overseeing training of the Iraqi army unit in Sadr City, led one of the small daily U.S. convoys through the district's streets, Mahdi Army fighters faded from view.
A Mahdi Army member in civilian clothes, standing in Sadr City 's main road at an informal checkpoint, caught sight of Wayman's approaching Humvees and scuttled out of sight, disappearing into the crowds of men watching the Americans.
As Wayman visited what were supposed to be Iraqi army checkpoints in Sadr City that morning, the first stop showed not a single soldier of Iraq's regular army at his post monitoring passing cars for bombs, kidnappers and the like.
Tensions have risen in recent weeks, but both Sadr and U.S. commanders have so far avoided the kind of open challenge that could lead to another confrontation. As sectarian violence intensified last month, U.S. forces again began moving against specific targets in Sadr City and elsewhere. U.S. commanders were careful to say they were targeting only "criminals" behind suspected death squads, not renewing a fight against the Mahdi Army.
An official of Sadr's movement who identified himself as Abu Hassan al-Thahabi said last month that leaders of the organization had generally ordered restraint. He spoke to a reporter after a bombing that killed at least 66 people on a crowded street in Sadr City. His hands still black with soot and grease from pulling out dead and wounded after the bombing, Thahabi said: "If the leadership says fight, we will fight. If they say no, we will not fight."
Rivals and Allies
At the time of the U.S.-led invasion in 2003, Sadr's militia did not exist. Today, his army numbers tens of thousands. In 2004, Bremer issued a vague order aimed at the Mahdi Army stipulating that militias should be disbanded at some unspecified date. The order set rules under which militias could keep working in the meantime.
The militias rapidly infiltrated key government agencies. Sadr's movement was not alone; it worked in parallel with another Shiite movement, the Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq, headed by Abdul Aziz Hakim.
Hakim's militia is known as the Badr Brigade. Its members largely took control of the Interior Ministry after the 2005 elections, building commando and other police forces. They are better organized and better armed than the Mahdi Army, thanks to decades of Iranian backing when it opposed Hussein. The Mahdi Army tended to supply the rank and file among Iraq's new police forces, rather than commanders. Together, the two Shiite militias infiltrated into Iraq's security forces thousands of people whose loyalty is to the religious parties rather than the national unity government.
In addition, Sadr's four ministries control 70,000 uniformed, armed men who are part of a government agency known as the Facilities Protection Service, according to the Interior Ministry. U.S. military commanders acknowledge that the agency has mushroomed to more than 140,000, largely outside American notice. A top former U.S. military commander has said militia fighters under the Facilities Protection Service are tied to kidnappings, execution-style killings and other crimes.
Both movements can also field thousands of armed civilian men in a matter of hours. Hakim, the leader of the Supreme Council, boasted to his followers in December that he could muster 200,000 militia fighters.
The Sadr movement claims more. "All Iraq is Mahdi Army," said Thamara al-Fetlawi, a civilian leader of the God's Martyrs Foundation, which cares for the families of slain and wounded Sadr militiamen as well as offering broader social services to followers of Sadr.
Fetlawi, like some other Sadr officials, rejected the definition of the Mahdi Army as a militia, apparently as a tactical move against any future efforts to disband the militias. Instead, he called it "the people's army," suggesting ordinary men who spontaneously grab their own weapons and respond when need and Shiite clerics call. The weapons seen by Washington Post reporters in Sadr City on the night of the Feb. 22 Samarra bombing included grenade launchers and heavy machine guns.
Sadr's Mahdi Army and the Supreme Council's Badr Brigade -- rivals that fought deadly battles in power struggles in the predominantly Shiite south last year -- cooperate when their interests overlap. In the turbulent days after the Samarra bombing, Sadr and Badr militiamen marched openly in a Shiite neighborhood of central Baghdad, each carrying banners declaring their battalion and brigade designations within their militias.
American officials have called the Shiite militias a danger to the Iraqi state. But the United States has yet to tackle what it and the Iraqi government say is their goal of dismantling the militias. In a congressionally mandated report last month, the State Department said that "a plan is being developed to assist Iraqi leaders" in breaking up the militias of the governing Shiite religious parties.
A more ominous warning came recently from the departing British ambassador to Iraq, William Patey, in a cable that was leaked. "If we are to avoid a descent into civil war and anarchy, then preventing the Jaish al-Mahdi from developing into a state within a state, as Hezbollah has done in Lebanon, will be a priority," Patey wrote, using the Arabic term for Mahdi Army.
'Claiming to Be the Mahdi Army'
Top U.S. officials and leaders of the Sadr movement both say many of the gunmen claiming to be in the Mahdi Army are increasingly operating outside Sadr's control. Nouri, Sadr's brother-in-law, and others blamed rogue elements and impostors for escalating killings and kidnappings since the Samarra bombing. Many of the attacks since July have focused on driving Sunnis from predominantly Shiite neighborhoods of Baghdad.
"I will say that evil exists in every sect and every place," Nouri said in the interview at his home in Najaf. "And also good exists. Just like with the Jews and the Christians, it is so in Islam.
"They might be gangs claiming to be the Mahdi Army and doing these bad things. But they don't believe in the doctrine, they only do what they want and wear clothes of the Mahdi Army. They do not follow the guidance of the leaders," Nouri said. "They are exposed when there are orders from the high command to sit and do nothing and still they do their acts. Anyone who is not following such orders from the Sadr office is not a member of the Mahdi Army."
"After the Samarra bombing, it seems there were major reprisals organized for large part in Sadr circles," said Hiltermann, of the International Crisis Group. "Moqtada himself was very clear no revenge should be taken. It's not clear whether he was simply not listened to, or was giving a double message -- one to the outside world, one to followers."
Unable to figure out Sadr's militia or approach him on political terms, Americans have been frustrated in their hopes of reining in the Mahdi Army, as well as the Badr Brigade.
"It would be a whole lot easier if these armed illegal groups had a coordinated structure with a clear headquarters," a Western diplomat in Baghdad said last month in response to questions about why no progress had been made on U.S. and Iraqi pledges to disband the militias. Ultimately, Hiltermann said, the Mahdi Army, as well as the Supreme Council and both groups' Sunni rivals, need only bide their time, until growing opposition to the war among the American public brings U.S. troops home.
"Then, the real struggle begins," Hiltermann said.
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News Reports:
Iraq, Iran and the New Shiite Crescent - American Chronicle
Arabs Fear Rising Shiite Power in Iraq - FOX NEWS
'Shiite Giant' Extends Its Reach - Washington Post
[ Iraq succumbs to Shiites. Iran influence now extends to other Arab nations.]
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AMERICAN CHRONICLE - January 08, 2007
IRAQ, IRAN AND THE NEW SHIITE CRESCENT
By Greg Reeson
Even before the rise of the post-Saddam government in Iraq, Sunni leaders in Egypt and Jordan warned of a “Shiite Crescent,” a zone of influence and power by Islam’s second largest branch that stretched across the Middle East from Beirut to Tehran. The push for Shiite dominance, which has been led by an increasingly bold and defiant regime in Iran, is making Sunni Arabs in the region gradually more nervous, and with good reason.
Shiites, who represent less than twenty percent of all the world’s Muslims, have long been subject to Sunni dominated regimes throughout most of the Middle East. Prior to the U.S.-led invasion of Iraq in 2003, Iran was the only country with a Shiite majority population and a Shiite-led government. With the toppling of Saddam Hussein’s Sunni minority dictatorship, Iraq (which is sixty percent Shiite) is now led, albeit tenuously, by a Shiite-dominated unity government that, when combined with an aggressive regional power play by Iran, has emboldened Shiites in Sunni-led countries.
Iran’s Shiite regime has been fomenting unrest in Iraq since the very beginning of the war in early 2003. Wielding significant influence among Iraq’s Shia in the south, Iran has provided weapons, fighters, and training for militias conducting attacks against coalition forces and Sunni insurgents. Iran’s hand can be felt in everything in Iraq from the explosive materials contained in IEDs to the sectarian violence waged by private militaries like Shiite cleric Moqtada al-Sadr’s Mehdi Army. The ultimate goal, of course, is to forge an Iraq that is at best completely dominated by Iran, or at worst openly friendly toward Iraq’s former foe.
In Bahrain, which is seventy percent Shiite, a Sunni minority regime has been increasingly under fire from a discontented populace demanding better living conditions and increased representation in government. Iran has close ties to Shiites throughout the region and regularly uses its influence to inflame Shiite passions when it suits Tehran’s needs. The Shiites in Bahrain have witnessed the events unfolding in Iraq and are now moving to make their voices heard.
In Lebanon, which is governed by a coalition of Sunnis, Shiites, and Christians, Hezbollah is leading massive protests that demand Shiite power equivalent to their proportion of the population (with about a third of the population, the Shia are the largest single group in Lebanon). Emboldened by a remarkable performance against the Israeli military during the most recent conflict last summer, Iranian sponsored Hezbollah is waging a proxy war against the Jewish State while increasing its popularity among Lebanon’s Shiites.
And while some include Syria in the Shiite Crescent, Assad’s dictatorship is actually Alawite, a sect of Islam that promotes pan-Arabism and is not ideologically aligned with the Shia. Still, Syria is openly allied with the clerics in Iran and serves as a launch pad for Iranian arms and fighters headed for Lebanon.
With Iranian influence spreading throughout the Middle East, countries like Saudi Arabia, Egypt and Jordan, all with strong Shiite minorities, are becoming increasingly nervous at the prospect of rising Shiite power in a region traditionally dominated by Sunni Arabs. They fear tensions with their own Shiite populations and some, like Saudi Arabia, have openly hinted that intervention in Iraq on behalf of Sunnis is a realistic possibility to stop the spread of Iranian influence.
Iran, in its quest to become the most powerful nation in the Middle East, has led the push for increased Shiite influence throughout the region. Shiites in Bahrain and Lebanon have watched the consolidation of power in Iraq and begun to assert themselves politically against governments that are not representative of their populations. Sunnis are nervous, and rightfully so. If Iran succeeds in acquiring a nuclear weapon, the fear of a Shiite Crescent will be eclipsed by the reality of a Shiite dominance of the Middle East that will persevere for generations.
Greg Reeson is a Senior Writer for GOPUSA and a Featured Writer for The New Media Journal and The Veteran's Voice. He is the author of the forthcoming "Persistent Conflict: Redefining the War on Terror," due out in 2009.
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FOX NEWS - April 24, 2003
Arabs Fear Rising Shiite Power in Iraq
CAIRO, Egypt
The new assertiveness of Iraq's Shiite Muslim majority has raised worries elsewhere in the mostly Sunni Muslim Middle East, where governments fear the rise of an Iranian-style theocracy, unrest at home and revived tensions within the family of Islam.
Saudi Arabia, with its own significant Shiite population, may feel among the most threatened by events in Iraq, its neighbor to the north. But even farther afield in places like Egypt, there is concern about what is seen as Shiite restiveness.
"Now the game is how to contain it," Egyptian political scientist Gehad Auda said.
Sunnis are by far the majority of the world's more than 1 billion Muslims, but in Iraq they make up only about a third of the 24 million people. Most of the rest are Shiite.
Saddam Hussein's regime was dominated by Sunnis. Now that his regime has been toppled by U.S. and British forces, Shiites are bursting forth to make clear they expect more say in Iraq's political future.
This week, an annual ritual that was repressed by Saddam's regime became a display of Shiite power as hundreds of thousands made a pilgrimage to the central Iraqi city of Karbala to commemorate the 7th century martyrdom of the Prophet Muhammad's grandson Hussein. While performing the ritual, many pilgrims shouted anti-U.S. as well as anti-Saddam slogans.
"The end of Saddam the tyrant has awakened the Shiite giant in Iraq," Saudi political analyst Khaled bin Sulaiman al-Sulaiman said Wednesday.
Auda predicted that nations in Iraq's neighborhood would try to slow political reforms the United States envisions that could result in Iraqi Shiites voting themselves into power.
"Democracy wouldn't serve the purpose of containment," Auda said.
He expects Saudi Arabia to work with countries like Egypt, whose status as the largest Arab country and a key U.S. ally gives it political muscle in the region, to try put its own stamp on Iraq's future.
Egypt's government may feel it has to act to calm Sunni fundamentalists, a growing political force in Egypt, Auda said. Sunni fundamentalists are deeply suspicious of Shiites.
In Egypt, where Shiite traditions are largely unknown, bloody television and newspaper images this week of Iraqi Shiites slashing their bodies and crying out in a stylized display of mourning for Hussein were viewed by many with baffled distaste.
Shiites are more visible in Saudi Arabia, making up 10 to 15 percent of the kingdom's roughly 19 million people, but they complain of restrictions on their freedom of expression, inability to advance in government jobs and other discrimination. The divide is deepened by a puritanical Sunni code in Saudi Arabia that shuns not only other religions but also other Muslim sects.
In the 1980s, Saudi Arabia was convinced that mostly Shiite Iran planned to spread its 1979 Islamic revolution and exploit the complaints of Saudi Shiites. The kingdom and other Arab states supported Saddam in his 1980-88 war with Iran.
In 1988, Saudi Arabia broke relations with Iran, accusing it of supporting terrorism and subversion. Relations were restored shortly after the 1991 Gulf War, but suspicions are being revived now that Iran is seen as meddling in Iraq, its neighbor to the west.
Islam has been divided into the orthodox Sunni and minority Shiite sects since soon after the death of the Prophet Muhammad in 632. Sunnis accepted Abu Bakr, a respected contemporary of the prophet, to lead what was then an international political as well as spiritual empire.
A small group, the "shi'at Ali," or party of Ali, followed the much younger Ali, Muhammad's cousin and son-and-law.
In one 7th century battle rooted in the dispute, Hussein, Ali's son, was killed by Sunni rivals on the plains of Karbala in what is now Iraq.
The bloodshed has continued even in modern times.
Sunni, Shiite and Christian militias all fought each other during Lebanon's 1975-90 civil war. In the Gulf state of Bahrain, where Shiites are a slight majority but the ruling family is Sunni, Shiites staged a violent campaign for political reform in the 1990s, triggering a government crackdown.
Lebanon's war ended when a power-sharing deal was struck under which the president is always Maronite Catholic, the prime minister Sunni Muslim, and the speaker of parliament Shiite Muslim. Calm came to Bahrain when the emir bowed to demands for more democracy that gave Shiites a say in politics.
The Bahraini and Lebanese examples showed that the Sunni-Shiite rivalry can be peacefully resolved. Ali Fakhro, a former Bahraini minister of education and a Sunni, said he believed all Iraqis understand that if they fought each other, the U.S. and British troops that ousted Saddam would linger, denying Iraq its independence.
"I think both Sunnis and Shiites realize these cards should not be given to the American occupiers for the exploitation of Iraq," he said. "I have great faith in the Iraqi people and I think its time they are allowed to decide their own fate and live united."
--
Iraq's Rising Power
'Shiite Giant' Extends Its Reach
THE WASHINGTON POST - August 24, 2006
Sadr's Armed Movement Becomes Pivotal Force in Fractured Country
KUFA, Iraq.
Pumping their fists in the air, the men and boys inside the colonnaded mosque shouted their loyalty to Shiite Muslim leader Moqtada al-Sadr. "Hasten the coming of the Mahdi!" thousands chanted in the baking sun of the open-air mosque, summoning the central religious figure of Sadr's movement. "And curse his enemies!"
Booming loudspeakers outside the mosque echoed the devotion of Sadr's followers converging for Friday prayers last month in Kufa, the cleric's spiritual base outside the Shiite holy city of Najaf. "Moqtada! Moqtada!" martial male voices intoned over the loudspeakers in rhythmic cadence with the footsteps of the gathering worshipers. "Even the child in the mother's cradle cries: 'Moqtada! Moqtada!' "
Sadr's followers answer as one when his movement calls them, and his organization of social, religious, political and military programs -- as well as the young clerics, politicians and fighters around him -- has become the most pivotal force in Iraq after the United States.
Millions of Sadr's supporters turned out in December elections to give his movement the largest bloc in parliament, which in turn put him in control of four government ministries. Thousands of male followers abandoned their homes and jobs when a bomb destroyed a Shiite shrine in Samarra on Feb. 22, rallying at Sadr headquarters on a night and day of retaliatory bloodletting that plunged Iraq into sectarian war.
While opposition to the U.S. military presence in Iraq remains one of its core tenets, the Sadr movement's militia, called the Mahdi Army, took heavy casualties in two military uprisings against better-armed, better-trained U.S. forces in 2004. Today, according to Sadr leaders and outside analysts, the movement is husbanding its strength and waiting for American troops to go.
Sadr "clearly is the most potent political figure, and the most popular one," in Iraq, said Joost Hiltermann, Middle East project director for the Brussels-based International Crisis Group. "Unless directly provoked, Sadrists will lay low, because they know the Americans' time in Iraq is coming to an end," he said. "Why would they risk another major loss of fighters if it's not necessary? Americans in their eyes are already defeated -- they're going to leave."
In the plainly furnished front room of his simple house in Najaf, one of Sadr's top aides agreed.
"The first time the Sadr trend fought them, it was forced on us," said Riyadh al-Nouri, a brother-in-law of Sadr's, reflecting the movement's belief that American military and civilian leaders provoked the confrontations with the cleric's followers in 2004. "We had no choice. Sayyid Moqtada didn't want to fight," Nouri said, using a religious honorific for Sadr. "This time, it might be the people who are mad and upset who would do this again. But as of now, in terms of orders from the Sadr trend, it doesn't call for these things."
"Until now, the Shiite giant has not begun to move. But if things come to a dead end," Nouri added, Shiite religious authorities "could take a decision to move him. It depends on them."
"Until now, they have patience," Nouri said.
Building a Movement
The movement that Sadr now leads took shape in the seminaries of Najaf, a theological center of the Shiite world, as clerics in the second half of the 20th century sought to counter what were then growing secular and nationalist movements in the Arab world. Sadr's own work since the U.S.-led invasion builds upon the social and health programs for Shiite poor begun by his father, Grand Ayatollah Mohammed Sadiq al-Sadr, in the 1990s. Sadr's father died with two of his sons in 1999, in an assassination believed to have been ordered by Iraqi President Saddam Hussein.
The Sadr movement's ultimate goal is a "united Islamic state," Bahaa al-Araji, a senior lawmaker in the Sadr political bloc, said in an interview. In Baghdad's Sadr City and other areas under Sadr's control, women uniformly cover their hair with scarves in the style of conservative Muslims. Islamic scholars operating with Sadr's office help arbitrate divorces, inheritances and other social matters in accordance with religious law. And fighters claiming to be part of Sadr's Mahdi Army -- named for a figure some Muslims believe will usher in an era of justice and true belief just before the end of time -- enforce a stringent Islamic code that includes the prohibition of alcohol and help enforce the orders of extrajudicial Islamic courts.
The movement is highly structured, largely along the lines of the Lebanese Hezbollah organization, building for its followers a state within a state while also acquiring a share of power in Iraq's formal government. Sadr, like Hezbollah, built popularity in part by providing social services such as health care. Because he controls the Health Ministry, and with it the hospitals and clinics of Iraq, his followers bear their children in public hospitals decorated with posters of the young cleric. They go to their graves washed by workers of a Sadr charity at a sprawling Shiite cemetery in Najaf, at a cost of 5,000 dinars, about $3.40, one-fifteenth of what grieving families outside Sadr's network pay. Sadr also sponsors the God's Martyr Foundation, which supports veterans and the families of fighters who are killed.
Under a tithing system followed by Sadr's movement and many other mainstream Shiite groups, those who are financially capable give one-fifth of their income, capital investments or both to their religious leaders.
At Sadr's busy headquarters in Najaf last month, a steady stream of men poured in to sign up for a Sadr recruitment drive in the name of rebuilding the Samarra shrine. Younger men offered their labor. Other followers offered cash, including a proud grandfather who prodded forward a toddling grandson clutching two crisp U.S. $5 bills.
Describing the method of building Sadr's organization, Araji said, "We now see resistance should be political, and not military."
Avoiding Confrontation
Sadr's relationship with the occupying U.S. forces has been hostile, and at times violent. In early 2004, L. Paul Bremer, then the top U.S. administrator in Iraq, declared Sadr an "outlaw." Bremer's spokesmen announced a murder warrant accusing Sadr in the stabbing death of a fellow Shiite cleric. Sadr's forces battled against the U.S. military in Sadr City, Najaf and across the south that year. But in elections in 2005, Sadr's movement participated in the political process and, along with other Shiite parties, claimed power and became part of the government.
Today, Sadr's movement remains wary of the U.S. forces now trying to impose order on chaotic Baghdad. Mahdi Army fighters openly operate checkpoints in Sadr City and elsewhere, standing at intersections and positioning themselves between two lanes of traffic on Sadr turf, scanning each car for strangers. They have sometimes taken Sunni Arab men away for detention or execution, according to Sunni witnesses. But they hide their weapons from American eyes, tucking pistols in waistbands under their shirts or hiding automatic rifles behind doorways.
When U.S. patrols roll into Sadr City, Mahdi Army patrols melt away. Last month, as Capt. Troy Wayman, one of the commanders of the tiny U.S. force overseeing training of the Iraqi army unit in Sadr City, led one of the small daily U.S. convoys through the district's streets, Mahdi Army fighters faded from view.
A Mahdi Army member in civilian clothes, standing in Sadr City 's main road at an informal checkpoint, caught sight of Wayman's approaching Humvees and scuttled out of sight, disappearing into the crowds of men watching the Americans.
As Wayman visited what were supposed to be Iraqi army checkpoints in Sadr City that morning, the first stop showed not a single soldier of Iraq's regular army at his post monitoring passing cars for bombs, kidnappers and the like.
Tensions have risen in recent weeks, but both Sadr and U.S. commanders have so far avoided the kind of open challenge that could lead to another confrontation. As sectarian violence intensified last month, U.S. forces again began moving against specific targets in Sadr City and elsewhere. U.S. commanders were careful to say they were targeting only "criminals" behind suspected death squads, not renewing a fight against the Mahdi Army.
An official of Sadr's movement who identified himself as Abu Hassan al-Thahabi said last month that leaders of the organization had generally ordered restraint. He spoke to a reporter after a bombing that killed at least 66 people on a crowded street in Sadr City. His hands still black with soot and grease from pulling out dead and wounded after the bombing, Thahabi said: "If the leadership says fight, we will fight. If they say no, we will not fight."
Rivals and Allies
At the time of the U.S.-led invasion in 2003, Sadr's militia did not exist. Today, his army numbers tens of thousands. In 2004, Bremer issued a vague order aimed at the Mahdi Army stipulating that militias should be disbanded at some unspecified date. The order set rules under which militias could keep working in the meantime.
The militias rapidly infiltrated key government agencies. Sadr's movement was not alone; it worked in parallel with another Shiite movement, the Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq, headed by Abdul Aziz Hakim.
Hakim's militia is known as the Badr Brigade. Its members largely took control of the Interior Ministry after the 2005 elections, building commando and other police forces. They are better organized and better armed than the Mahdi Army, thanks to decades of Iranian backing when it opposed Hussein. The Mahdi Army tended to supply the rank and file among Iraq's new police forces, rather than commanders. Together, the two Shiite militias infiltrated into Iraq's security forces thousands of people whose loyalty is to the religious parties rather than the national unity government.
In addition, Sadr's four ministries control 70,000 uniformed, armed men who are part of a government agency known as the Facilities Protection Service, according to the Interior Ministry. U.S. military commanders acknowledge that the agency has mushroomed to more than 140,000, largely outside American notice. A top former U.S. military commander has said militia fighters under the Facilities Protection Service are tied to kidnappings, execution-style killings and other crimes.
Both movements can also field thousands of armed civilian men in a matter of hours. Hakim, the leader of the Supreme Council, boasted to his followers in December that he could muster 200,000 militia fighters.
The Sadr movement claims more. "All Iraq is Mahdi Army," said Thamara al-Fetlawi, a civilian leader of the God's Martyrs Foundation, which cares for the families of slain and wounded Sadr militiamen as well as offering broader social services to followers of Sadr.
Fetlawi, like some other Sadr officials, rejected the definition of the Mahdi Army as a militia, apparently as a tactical move against any future efforts to disband the militias. Instead, he called it "the people's army," suggesting ordinary men who spontaneously grab their own weapons and respond when need and Shiite clerics call. The weapons seen by Washington Post reporters in Sadr City on the night of the Feb. 22 Samarra bombing included grenade launchers and heavy machine guns.
Sadr's Mahdi Army and the Supreme Council's Badr Brigade -- rivals that fought deadly battles in power struggles in the predominantly Shiite south last year -- cooperate when their interests overlap. In the turbulent days after the Samarra bombing, Sadr and Badr militiamen marched openly in a Shiite neighborhood of central Baghdad, each carrying banners declaring their battalion and brigade designations within their militias.
American officials have called the Shiite militias a danger to the Iraqi state. But the United States has yet to tackle what it and the Iraqi government say is their goal of dismantling the militias. In a congressionally mandated report last month, the State Department said that "a plan is being developed to assist Iraqi leaders" in breaking up the militias of the governing Shiite religious parties.
A more ominous warning came recently from the departing British ambassador to Iraq, William Patey, in a cable that was leaked. "If we are to avoid a descent into civil war and anarchy, then preventing the Jaish al-Mahdi from developing into a state within a state, as Hezbollah has done in Lebanon, will be a priority," Patey wrote, using the Arabic term for Mahdi Army.
'Claiming to Be the Mahdi Army'
Top U.S. officials and leaders of the Sadr movement both say many of the gunmen claiming to be in the Mahdi Army are increasingly operating outside Sadr's control. Nouri, Sadr's brother-in-law, and others blamed rogue elements and impostors for escalating killings and kidnappings since the Samarra bombing. Many of the attacks since July have focused on driving Sunnis from predominantly Shiite neighborhoods of Baghdad.
"I will say that evil exists in every sect and every place," Nouri said in the interview at his home in Najaf. "And also good exists. Just like with the Jews and the Christians, it is so in Islam.
"They might be gangs claiming to be the Mahdi Army and doing these bad things. But they don't believe in the doctrine, they only do what they want and wear clothes of the Mahdi Army. They do not follow the guidance of the leaders," Nouri said. "They are exposed when there are orders from the high command to sit and do nothing and still they do their acts. Anyone who is not following such orders from the Sadr office is not a member of the Mahdi Army."
"After the Samarra bombing, it seems there were major reprisals organized for large part in Sadr circles," said Hiltermann, of the International Crisis Group. "Moqtada himself was very clear no revenge should be taken. It's not clear whether he was simply not listened to, or was giving a double message -- one to the outside world, one to followers."
Unable to figure out Sadr's militia or approach him on political terms, Americans have been frustrated in their hopes of reining in the Mahdi Army, as well as the Badr Brigade.
"It would be a whole lot easier if these armed illegal groups had a coordinated structure with a clear headquarters," a Western diplomat in Baghdad said last month in response to questions about why no progress had been made on U.S. and Iraqi pledges to disband the militias. Ultimately, Hiltermann said, the Mahdi Army, as well as the Supreme Council and both groups' Sunni rivals, need only bide their time, until growing opposition to the war among the American public brings U.S. troops home.
"Then, the real struggle begins," Hiltermann said.
______________
Crescent unsettles Sunnis
-
Crescent unsettles Sunnis
New Reports:
Shiite ascent unsettles Iraq’s Sunni neighbors - MSNBC
[ Sunnis affraid of rise of Shia power in the Middle East. ]
.
MSNBC - 29 January 2005
SHIITE CRESCENT ASCENT UNSETTLES IRAQ'S SUNNI NEIGHBORS
Sunni Arabs concerned over a 'Shiite crescent' of power in Mideast
While the United States waits with optimism for Iraq’s elections, neighboring Arab nations are nervous. They fear the vote could signal the rise of Shiite Muslims in their Sunni-dominated region, embolden their own Shiite communities and perhaps strengthen Iraq’s ties with Iran.
Arab nations long have been wary of non-Arab, Shiite Iran and worry that an alliance with a Shiite-ruled Iraq would shift the balance of power in a region dominated for centuries by Sunni Muslims. The largely Sunni Muslim regimes also fear such an alliance would inspire unrest among their Shiite populations, which have long complained of discrimination.
“This is really historically unprecedented,” said Farid el-Khazen, chairman of the political studies department at the American University of Beirut. “For the first time in the history of the modern state, Shiites have a share in ruling a country such as Iraq.”
'A Shiite crescent'
Jordan’s King Abdullah II told The Washington Post in December that Iran was seeking to create “a Shiite crescent” in the Middle East that would include Iraq, Syria and Lebanon. The comments angered Iran, and the king later said he was not opposed to Shiites.
Still, the words exposed the barely hidden fears about Shiite power.
Lebanon’s most senior Shiite cleric, Grand Ayatollah Mohammed Hussein Fadlallah, said Friday that concerns of a Shiite takeover in Iraq “are unfounded.”
“Shiites are not seeking to take control of the government in Iraq,” he told The Associated Press after Friday prayers in south Beirut.
______________
Crescent unsettles Sunnis
New Reports:
Shiite ascent unsettles Iraq’s Sunni neighbors - MSNBC
[ Sunnis affraid of rise of Shia power in the Middle East. ]
.
MSNBC - 29 January 2005
SHIITE CRESCENT ASCENT UNSETTLES IRAQ'S SUNNI NEIGHBORS
Sunni Arabs concerned over a 'Shiite crescent' of power in Mideast
While the United States waits with optimism for Iraq’s elections, neighboring Arab nations are nervous. They fear the vote could signal the rise of Shiite Muslims in their Sunni-dominated region, embolden their own Shiite communities and perhaps strengthen Iraq’s ties with Iran.
Arab nations long have been wary of non-Arab, Shiite Iran and worry that an alliance with a Shiite-ruled Iraq would shift the balance of power in a region dominated for centuries by Sunni Muslims. The largely Sunni Muslim regimes also fear such an alliance would inspire unrest among their Shiite populations, which have long complained of discrimination.
“This is really historically unprecedented,” said Farid el-Khazen, chairman of the political studies department at the American University of Beirut. “For the first time in the history of the modern state, Shiites have a share in ruling a country such as Iraq.”
'A Shiite crescent'
Jordan’s King Abdullah II told The Washington Post in December that Iran was seeking to create “a Shiite crescent” in the Middle East that would include Iraq, Syria and Lebanon. The comments angered Iran, and the king later said he was not opposed to Shiites.
Still, the words exposed the barely hidden fears about Shiite power.
Lebanon’s most senior Shiite cleric, Grand Ayatollah Mohammed Hussein Fadlallah, said Friday that concerns of a Shiite takeover in Iraq “are unfounded.”
“Shiites are not seeking to take control of the government in Iraq,” he told The Associated Press after Friday prayers in south Beirut.
______________
Shiite Takeover
-
News Reports:
Are the Shias on the brink of taking over the Middle East? - Observer
Nasrallah denies Iran is seeking 'Shiite crescent' in Middle East - Haaretz
[ Threats of Shia takeoever premature. ]
.
ARE THE SHIAS ON THE BRING OF TAKING OVER THE MIDDLE EAST?
Jason Burke - The Observer, 23 July 2006
This weekend, as bombing in Lebanon and rocketing in Israel continue and the diplomacy finally gets under way, intelligence analysts from Washington to New Delhi are embarking on a gigantic game of 'join the dots'. Some of the questions they are trying to answer are familiar - what is the true nature of the links between Hizbollah and Damascus and Tehran? What involvement do the Iranians have in Gaza or the West Bank? But another question is of greater significance: Are we witnessing a profound shift in the power balance of the Middle East that will determine the geopolitics of the region for decades to come?
Answers are, like most analysis of the Middle East, a mixture of hunch, experience, prejudice and fact, but it seems clear there is a new phenomenon in the region that can be described as, at the very least, 'a Shia resurgence'.
Ten or 15 per cent of the world's 1.4bn Muslims are Shia. The differences with the majority Sunnis are doctrinal, cultural and often political, and date back to a schism over who would succeed the Prophet Muhammad 1,400 years ago. For much of that time Shias were a persecuted minority, creating a powerful culture of martyrdom. However, there have been several episodes when the Shia, despite their smaller numbers, have been more dominant - most recently in 1979 when the Iranian revolution and the regime of the Ayatollah Khomeini inspired hundreds of millions of Muslims of all denominations worldwide, promoting a re-energised political Islam. For a short period, all eyes turned to the Shia. In the intervening years their star waned. Now, it is shining bright again.
Five major elements underpin the new Shia revival. The first is the sudden militancy of Iran, which has been led aggressively onto the world stage by President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad. This new Iranian confidence is itself based on internal developments but also three main external factors: the removal of the Taliban from its eastern border in 2001; the removal of Saddam (a chauvinist Sunni) from its border; and vastly increased oil revenues.
The second major element of 'the Shia comeback' is the new power of Iraq's Shia who, though 65 per cent of the population, had been ruled by the Sunni minority for at least 400 years. Now the 'National Unity government' of Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki in Baghdad is dominated by Shia friends of Iran.
Iran has profited enormously from chaos in Iraq. A recent report for the American Institute of Peace, a Washington think-tank, pointed out that Iran's leaders meet with Iraq's most influential personality, Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani, who will not meet Americans. The report continued: 'Iraq's leaders visit to Tehran to negotiate on substantive issues such as border security and joint energy projects. Iranian businessmen are investing heavily in Iraq's overwhelmingly Shia southern regions, and Iran's intelligence operatives are embedded throughout Iraq's nascent security forces and within the Shia militias that have tremendous street power in the south, especially in the city of Basra.'
This is reinforced by British and US military sources in Iraq. 'The Iranians were there before we arrived,' said a British intelligence officer. 'I have no doubt they will be there when we leave.'
Yet the other elements of the new 'Shia revival' are less certain. The 'Shia axis' depicted by Israeli, US and some European commentators and by Sunni regional powers links Syria, Hizbollah and finally Sunni Palestinian organisations such as Hamas. While rulers like King Abdullah of Jordan or Egypt's Hosni Mubarak have obvious reasons to fear a resurgent Shia bloc, the broad coalition of 'neo-conservative' analysts seek to minimise local social, economic and political factors behind radical movements in favour of all-encompassing explanations that finger individual people or states. The latter insist the overt indications of co-operation - such as the fact that Hizbollah's local leadership shares an office in Tehran with Hamas - are 'the tip of the iceberg' of close co-ordination. 'Hizbollah is an Iranian creation,' said Ilan Berman, of the American Foreign Policy Council.
Yet, despite the claims, there are many who are wary of such analyses. 'It is almost too easy to believe in the "Shia crescent",' said Professor Jean-Francois Seznec, of Columbia University's Middle East Institute. 'If you look at the map it seems to make a lot of sense but, though there is to an extent a revival, it is a bit far-fetched to go from that to a conspiracy to take over the region.'
Beyond the countries where they are majorities, Seznec said, the Shia position is complicated. In Saudi Arabia, the substantial Shia minority is not moving closer to Iran, not least because the ruling royal family has offered them substantial political concessions. Elsewhere, there are also complicated issues of ethnicity and nationalism that militate against loyalty to Tehran. There are millions of Shias in the Gulf, Afghanistan and Pakistan whose political allegiances are determined by local factors rather than pretensions of distant regimes. Even in Iraq, there are vicious splits between clerical factions led by maverick cleric Moqtada al-Sadr and those loyal to the far more senior Ali Sistani. Al-Sadr's challenge to the older leader has its roots in the myriad arguments that fissure the international Shia clerical community.
There is also ethnicity. Alexis Debat, an analyst at The Nixon Centre, stressed the profound animosity that has pitted Arabs against those, dominant in and around Iran, of Persian descent. 'I do not buy the "Shia axis" argument at all,' he said. 'A lot of people put it in those terms for political reasons, but Shias are too diverse, there are too many factions, too many conflicting allegiances.'
There are religious and cultural ties between Shia that become important in specific situations. Minor details, such as the fact that Hizbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah studied both in Iraq and Iran, take on a far greater significance. When men like Nasrallah look at the political landscape it is with two frames of reference, one secular, the other religious.
All analysts agree Iran has gained a huge amount of influence - 'soft' power - by saying openly what the majority, Arabs and Persians, Shia and Sunni, in the Middle Eastern 'street' say privately. 'The [Iranian] discourse is pan-Islamist and plays the chord of anti-imperialism, Arab nationalism and anti-Zionism,' said Olivier Roy, the director of the National Scientific Research Centre in Paris.
What Tehran says is also exactly what rulers like King Abdullah, Mubarak or the House of al-Saud cannot say for fear of angering Western allies. And though such regimes can buy off local discontent for a period with increased expenditure on social services and finely calibrated political concessions, the anger in the bazaars and the mosques cannot be contained for ever. It needs an outlet. Tehran, Hizbollah and others have understood this. In the great game of Middle Eastern politics, Western analysts are not the only ones joining the dots.
The day at a glance
· Israeli forces carry out 'limited' incursions inside southern Lebanon. Up to 1,500 soldiers are thought to have crossed the border.
· US Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice will go to the Middle East today.
· Israeli army says it attacked more than 150 targets in the past 24 hours. War planes launched raids on the town of al-Khiam and near the port of Tyre
· Evacuation of foreign nationals from Lebanon to Cyprus now tops 25,000.
· Militant groups in the Gaza Strip agreed to stop firing at Israel last night, senior Palestinian officials said.
· At least 345 civilians and a handful of Hizbollah fighters have been killed in Lebanon. Nineteen Israeli soldiers and 15 civilians have died.
· The Bush administration is rushing precision-guided bombs to Israel, which requested the shipment last week.
--
29 January 2009
NASRALLAH DENIES IRAN IS SEEKING SHIITE CRESCENT IN MIDDLE EAST
Hezbollah leader says accusations Iran is trying to form Shiite bloc in Iraq, Syria, and Lebanon are 'baseless.'
LEBANON - Hezbollah leader Sheikh Hassan Nasrallah in a speech on Monday evening defended Iran and said Tehran is not planning to implement a "Shiite crescent" in the Middle East.
"Iran is far from this plot of transforming Sunnis into Shiites or forming a Shiite Crescent in the region, such accusations are baseless," Nasrallah told a religious ceremony in Beirut's southern suburbs.
In December, Jordan's King Abdullah II told the Washington Post that Iran was seeking to create "a Shiite crescent" in the Middle East that would include Iraq, Lebanon and Syria. The comments angered Iran.
"Shiites are not seeking to take control of the region, and we do not pose a threat to everyone," Nasrallah said.
Hezbollah has been accused by the anti-Syrian forces in Lebanon of acting as Iran's proxy in Lebanon and stirring Sunni-Shiite tensions.
At least three people were killed and 152 injured last Tuesday in clashes between Sunni and Shiite Muslims apparently triggered by a row inside the campus of the Beirut Arab University between government supporters and the opposition led by Hezbollah.
Hezbollah has been calling for the resignation of Prime Minister Fouad Seniora and the formation of a new national unity government which will give the opposition power of veto.
______________
News Reports:
Are the Shias on the brink of taking over the Middle East? - Observer
Nasrallah denies Iran is seeking 'Shiite crescent' in Middle East - Haaretz
[ Threats of Shia takeoever premature. ]
.
ARE THE SHIAS ON THE BRING OF TAKING OVER THE MIDDLE EAST?
Jason Burke - The Observer, 23 July 2006
This weekend, as bombing in Lebanon and rocketing in Israel continue and the diplomacy finally gets under way, intelligence analysts from Washington to New Delhi are embarking on a gigantic game of 'join the dots'. Some of the questions they are trying to answer are familiar - what is the true nature of the links between Hizbollah and Damascus and Tehran? What involvement do the Iranians have in Gaza or the West Bank? But another question is of greater significance: Are we witnessing a profound shift in the power balance of the Middle East that will determine the geopolitics of the region for decades to come?
Answers are, like most analysis of the Middle East, a mixture of hunch, experience, prejudice and fact, but it seems clear there is a new phenomenon in the region that can be described as, at the very least, 'a Shia resurgence'.
Ten or 15 per cent of the world's 1.4bn Muslims are Shia. The differences with the majority Sunnis are doctrinal, cultural and often political, and date back to a schism over who would succeed the Prophet Muhammad 1,400 years ago. For much of that time Shias were a persecuted minority, creating a powerful culture of martyrdom. However, there have been several episodes when the Shia, despite their smaller numbers, have been more dominant - most recently in 1979 when the Iranian revolution and the regime of the Ayatollah Khomeini inspired hundreds of millions of Muslims of all denominations worldwide, promoting a re-energised political Islam. For a short period, all eyes turned to the Shia. In the intervening years their star waned. Now, it is shining bright again.
Five major elements underpin the new Shia revival. The first is the sudden militancy of Iran, which has been led aggressively onto the world stage by President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad. This new Iranian confidence is itself based on internal developments but also three main external factors: the removal of the Taliban from its eastern border in 2001; the removal of Saddam (a chauvinist Sunni) from its border; and vastly increased oil revenues.
The second major element of 'the Shia comeback' is the new power of Iraq's Shia who, though 65 per cent of the population, had been ruled by the Sunni minority for at least 400 years. Now the 'National Unity government' of Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki in Baghdad is dominated by Shia friends of Iran.
Iran has profited enormously from chaos in Iraq. A recent report for the American Institute of Peace, a Washington think-tank, pointed out that Iran's leaders meet with Iraq's most influential personality, Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani, who will not meet Americans. The report continued: 'Iraq's leaders visit to Tehran to negotiate on substantive issues such as border security and joint energy projects. Iranian businessmen are investing heavily in Iraq's overwhelmingly Shia southern regions, and Iran's intelligence operatives are embedded throughout Iraq's nascent security forces and within the Shia militias that have tremendous street power in the south, especially in the city of Basra.'
This is reinforced by British and US military sources in Iraq. 'The Iranians were there before we arrived,' said a British intelligence officer. 'I have no doubt they will be there when we leave.'
Yet the other elements of the new 'Shia revival' are less certain. The 'Shia axis' depicted by Israeli, US and some European commentators and by Sunni regional powers links Syria, Hizbollah and finally Sunni Palestinian organisations such as Hamas. While rulers like King Abdullah of Jordan or Egypt's Hosni Mubarak have obvious reasons to fear a resurgent Shia bloc, the broad coalition of 'neo-conservative' analysts seek to minimise local social, economic and political factors behind radical movements in favour of all-encompassing explanations that finger individual people or states. The latter insist the overt indications of co-operation - such as the fact that Hizbollah's local leadership shares an office in Tehran with Hamas - are 'the tip of the iceberg' of close co-ordination. 'Hizbollah is an Iranian creation,' said Ilan Berman, of the American Foreign Policy Council.
Yet, despite the claims, there are many who are wary of such analyses. 'It is almost too easy to believe in the "Shia crescent",' said Professor Jean-Francois Seznec, of Columbia University's Middle East Institute. 'If you look at the map it seems to make a lot of sense but, though there is to an extent a revival, it is a bit far-fetched to go from that to a conspiracy to take over the region.'
Beyond the countries where they are majorities, Seznec said, the Shia position is complicated. In Saudi Arabia, the substantial Shia minority is not moving closer to Iran, not least because the ruling royal family has offered them substantial political concessions. Elsewhere, there are also complicated issues of ethnicity and nationalism that militate against loyalty to Tehran. There are millions of Shias in the Gulf, Afghanistan and Pakistan whose political allegiances are determined by local factors rather than pretensions of distant regimes. Even in Iraq, there are vicious splits between clerical factions led by maverick cleric Moqtada al-Sadr and those loyal to the far more senior Ali Sistani. Al-Sadr's challenge to the older leader has its roots in the myriad arguments that fissure the international Shia clerical community.
There is also ethnicity. Alexis Debat, an analyst at The Nixon Centre, stressed the profound animosity that has pitted Arabs against those, dominant in and around Iran, of Persian descent. 'I do not buy the "Shia axis" argument at all,' he said. 'A lot of people put it in those terms for political reasons, but Shias are too diverse, there are too many factions, too many conflicting allegiances.'
There are religious and cultural ties between Shia that become important in specific situations. Minor details, such as the fact that Hizbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah studied both in Iraq and Iran, take on a far greater significance. When men like Nasrallah look at the political landscape it is with two frames of reference, one secular, the other religious.
All analysts agree Iran has gained a huge amount of influence - 'soft' power - by saying openly what the majority, Arabs and Persians, Shia and Sunni, in the Middle Eastern 'street' say privately. 'The [Iranian] discourse is pan-Islamist and plays the chord of anti-imperialism, Arab nationalism and anti-Zionism,' said Olivier Roy, the director of the National Scientific Research Centre in Paris.
What Tehran says is also exactly what rulers like King Abdullah, Mubarak or the House of al-Saud cannot say for fear of angering Western allies. And though such regimes can buy off local discontent for a period with increased expenditure on social services and finely calibrated political concessions, the anger in the bazaars and the mosques cannot be contained for ever. It needs an outlet. Tehran, Hizbollah and others have understood this. In the great game of Middle Eastern politics, Western analysts are not the only ones joining the dots.
The day at a glance
· Israeli forces carry out 'limited' incursions inside southern Lebanon. Up to 1,500 soldiers are thought to have crossed the border.
· US Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice will go to the Middle East today.
· Israeli army says it attacked more than 150 targets in the past 24 hours. War planes launched raids on the town of al-Khiam and near the port of Tyre
· Evacuation of foreign nationals from Lebanon to Cyprus now tops 25,000.
· Militant groups in the Gaza Strip agreed to stop firing at Israel last night, senior Palestinian officials said.
· At least 345 civilians and a handful of Hizbollah fighters have been killed in Lebanon. Nineteen Israeli soldiers and 15 civilians have died.
· The Bush administration is rushing precision-guided bombs to Israel, which requested the shipment last week.
--
29 January 2009
NASRALLAH DENIES IRAN IS SEEKING SHIITE CRESCENT IN MIDDLE EAST
Hezbollah leader says accusations Iran is trying to form Shiite bloc in Iraq, Syria, and Lebanon are 'baseless.'
LEBANON - Hezbollah leader Sheikh Hassan Nasrallah in a speech on Monday evening defended Iran and said Tehran is not planning to implement a "Shiite crescent" in the Middle East.
"Iran is far from this plot of transforming Sunnis into Shiites or forming a Shiite Crescent in the region, such accusations are baseless," Nasrallah told a religious ceremony in Beirut's southern suburbs.
In December, Jordan's King Abdullah II told the Washington Post that Iran was seeking to create "a Shiite crescent" in the Middle East that would include Iraq, Lebanon and Syria. The comments angered Iran.
"Shiites are not seeking to take control of the region, and we do not pose a threat to everyone," Nasrallah said.
Hezbollah has been accused by the anti-Syrian forces in Lebanon of acting as Iran's proxy in Lebanon and stirring Sunni-Shiite tensions.
At least three people were killed and 152 injured last Tuesday in clashes between Sunni and Shiite Muslims apparently triggered by a row inside the campus of the Beirut Arab University between government supporters and the opposition led by Hezbollah.
Hezbollah has been calling for the resignation of Prime Minister Fouad Seniora and the formation of a new national unity government which will give the opposition power of veto.
______________
Morocco ditches Iran
-
News Reports:
Morocco cuts diplomatic ties with Iran - F24
Morocco severs relations with Iran - Al Jazeera
Morocco cuts relations with Iran - BBC
[ Shiites converting Sunnis in Morocco]
.
FRANCE 24 - March 3, 2009
MOROCCO CUTS DIPLOMATIC TIES WITH IRAN
The Moroccan Foreign Ministry has announced it is severing its diplomatic relations with Iran. Sunni-dominated Morocco has expressed concern for what it sees as Iran’s efforts to convert Sunni Muslims to Shi’ism.
Morocco has cut diplomatic links with Iran, the Moroccan Foreign Ministry said on Friday, in the wake of an outcry in the Sunni Muslim world over a statement by an Iranian official questioning Sunni Bahrain’s sovereignty.
Rabat also criticised Iran for its efforts to spread its Shi’ite brand of Islam in Morocco, a move the ministry said it saw as threat to the North African country’s moderate Sunni religious identity.
“The Kingdom of Morocco has decided to break its diplomatic relations with the Islamic Republic of Iran beginning this Friday,” the ministry said.
Sunni scholars in Morocco and elsewhere have denounced what they see as Iran’s efforts to convert Sunni Muslims to Shi’ism, arguing the drive would create strife similar to the often bloody Shi’ite-Sunni divides in Iraq and Pakistan.
According to media reports, Ali Akbar Nateq-Nouri, an adviser to Iranian Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, said last month Shi’ite-ruled Iran had sovereignty over Bahrain.
In response Morocco’s King Mohammed sent the Bahraini monarch, King Hamad Bin Isa al-Khalifa, a message of support, calling the Iranian remarks “absurd” and a contradiction of international law.
On Feb. 25, Rabat recalled its envoy to Iran to protest what Foreign Minister Taieb Fassi Fihri said was “inappropriate language” directed against Morocco in a communique reported by the Iranian news agency IRNA.
Morocco had asked Teheran for an explanation as to why it had singled out Rabat in the statement but Iran ignored the request made one week ago, the ministry added in a statement.
The foreign ministry said this was “unacceptable” and accused Iranian representatives in Morocco of seeking to alter “the kingdom’s religious fundamentals,” it said in reference to Iran’s alleged state-backed drive to expand Shi’ism in Morocco.
SUNNI MOROCCO FELT UNDER THREAT
Religion a highly sensitive issue in Morocco because King Mohamed is the only Islamic leader who jointly holds the title of Amir al Mouminine (Commander of the Faithful) and head of the state.
The ministry said efforts by Iran to spread the Shi’ite version of Islam threatened Morocco’s Islamic unity and its identity built from the foundations of the moderate Sunni Malekite faith. It said:
“This kind of organised and sustained actions constitute an intolerable interference in the kingdom’s domestic affairs and are contrary to the rules and ethics of diplomatic action.”
Morocco, which enjoyed warm ties with Iran under the Shah until he was deposed in 1979, only normalised its relations with Iran by exchanging envoys in the late 1990s.
The government has always been concerned of Iran’s role in the Sunni world since its Shi’ite Islamic revolution toppled the monarchy in Tehran.
Religious figures have warned of what they call the menace against the country’s spiritual security by the Shi’ite conversion among Morocco’s 30 million people.
Political sources in Morocco say Shi’ite activists numbered several hundreds but they were making steady progress because of the popularity of radical Islamic groups backed
--
AL JAZEERA - 8 March 2009
MOROCCO SEVERS RELATIONS WITH IRAN
Rabat accuses Iranian ambassador of seeking to spread Shia Islam in the Sunni kingdom.
The foreign ministry equated proselytising with challenging Morocco's monarchy
Morocco has severed diplomatic relations with Iran, accusing the Iranian diplomatic mission in Rabat of seeking to spread Shia Islam in the predominantly Sunni Muslim kingdom.
A statement from Morocco's foreign ministry on Friday accused the Iranian embassy of "intolerable interference in the internal affairs of the kingdom", and of engaging in activities which threatened the religious unity of the country.
"The Kingdom of Morocco has decided to break its diplomatic relations with the Islamic Republic of Iran beginning this Friday," the ministry said.
Monouchehr Mottaki, Iran's foreign minister, said Morocco's decision was unexpected.
"The action by the Morocco government is surprising and questionable," Mottaki told reporters.
Bahrain controversy
Moroccan local media has repeatedly accused Iran of proselytising in recent years, claims rejected by the Iranian ambassador.
The controversy was fuelled recently by comments attributed to an adviser of Iran's supreme leader which questioned the sovereignty of Bahrain, a Gulf Arab state which has a majority Shia population but is ruled by Sunnis.
Morocco, however, has no official Shia population, with 99 per cent of the country being Sunni Muslim, and the rest either Jews or Christians.
Sunni scholars in Morocco have denounced what they say is an effort to convert people to Shia Islam, arguing that such a practice could ultimately lead to sectarian strife similar to that witnessed in Iraq after the US-led invasion in 2003.
Furthermore, as Mohamed VI, Morocco's king, is the country's official religious leader, any attempt to convert Sunni Muslims has been equated to an attack on the monarchy, the foreign ministry said.
Morocco and Iran have had rocky ties since the Iranian revolution in 1979. The two normalised relations only in the late 1990s.
--
BBC - Friday, 6 March 2009
Morocco cuts relations with Iran
Morocco has cut diplomatic links with Iran, amid a row over comments made by an Iranian politician last week.
Iran's former interior minister Ali Akbar Nateq Nuri said Bahrain used to be Iran's 14th province, and that it still had a seat in Iran's parliament.
Rabat led a chorus of disapproval from Arab states, who interpreted the remark as a claim of sovereignty over Bahrain.
Tehran issued an apology, claiming Mr Ali's comments had been misunderstood and saying it made no claim to Bahrain.
Mr Ali said he was merely making a comparison between the current system of government in Iran and previous systems.
Bahrain is ruled by a Sunni elite, but most of its population is Shia and many have close ties to predominantly Shia Iran.
______________
News Reports:
Morocco cuts diplomatic ties with Iran - F24
Morocco severs relations with Iran - Al Jazeera
Morocco cuts relations with Iran - BBC
[ Shiites converting Sunnis in Morocco]
.
FRANCE 24 - March 3, 2009
MOROCCO CUTS DIPLOMATIC TIES WITH IRAN
The Moroccan Foreign Ministry has announced it is severing its diplomatic relations with Iran. Sunni-dominated Morocco has expressed concern for what it sees as Iran’s efforts to convert Sunni Muslims to Shi’ism.
Morocco has cut diplomatic links with Iran, the Moroccan Foreign Ministry said on Friday, in the wake of an outcry in the Sunni Muslim world over a statement by an Iranian official questioning Sunni Bahrain’s sovereignty.
Rabat also criticised Iran for its efforts to spread its Shi’ite brand of Islam in Morocco, a move the ministry said it saw as threat to the North African country’s moderate Sunni religious identity.
“The Kingdom of Morocco has decided to break its diplomatic relations with the Islamic Republic of Iran beginning this Friday,” the ministry said.
Sunni scholars in Morocco and elsewhere have denounced what they see as Iran’s efforts to convert Sunni Muslims to Shi’ism, arguing the drive would create strife similar to the often bloody Shi’ite-Sunni divides in Iraq and Pakistan.
According to media reports, Ali Akbar Nateq-Nouri, an adviser to Iranian Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, said last month Shi’ite-ruled Iran had sovereignty over Bahrain.
In response Morocco’s King Mohammed sent the Bahraini monarch, King Hamad Bin Isa al-Khalifa, a message of support, calling the Iranian remarks “absurd” and a contradiction of international law.
On Feb. 25, Rabat recalled its envoy to Iran to protest what Foreign Minister Taieb Fassi Fihri said was “inappropriate language” directed against Morocco in a communique reported by the Iranian news agency IRNA.
Morocco had asked Teheran for an explanation as to why it had singled out Rabat in the statement but Iran ignored the request made one week ago, the ministry added in a statement.
The foreign ministry said this was “unacceptable” and accused Iranian representatives in Morocco of seeking to alter “the kingdom’s religious fundamentals,” it said in reference to Iran’s alleged state-backed drive to expand Shi’ism in Morocco.
SUNNI MOROCCO FELT UNDER THREAT
Religion a highly sensitive issue in Morocco because King Mohamed is the only Islamic leader who jointly holds the title of Amir al Mouminine (Commander of the Faithful) and head of the state.
The ministry said efforts by Iran to spread the Shi’ite version of Islam threatened Morocco’s Islamic unity and its identity built from the foundations of the moderate Sunni Malekite faith. It said:
“This kind of organised and sustained actions constitute an intolerable interference in the kingdom’s domestic affairs and are contrary to the rules and ethics of diplomatic action.”
Morocco, which enjoyed warm ties with Iran under the Shah until he was deposed in 1979, only normalised its relations with Iran by exchanging envoys in the late 1990s.
The government has always been concerned of Iran’s role in the Sunni world since its Shi’ite Islamic revolution toppled the monarchy in Tehran.
Religious figures have warned of what they call the menace against the country’s spiritual security by the Shi’ite conversion among Morocco’s 30 million people.
Political sources in Morocco say Shi’ite activists numbered several hundreds but they were making steady progress because of the popularity of radical Islamic groups backed
--
AL JAZEERA - 8 March 2009
MOROCCO SEVERS RELATIONS WITH IRAN
Rabat accuses Iranian ambassador of seeking to spread Shia Islam in the Sunni kingdom.
The foreign ministry equated proselytising with challenging Morocco's monarchy
Morocco has severed diplomatic relations with Iran, accusing the Iranian diplomatic mission in Rabat of seeking to spread Shia Islam in the predominantly Sunni Muslim kingdom.
A statement from Morocco's foreign ministry on Friday accused the Iranian embassy of "intolerable interference in the internal affairs of the kingdom", and of engaging in activities which threatened the religious unity of the country.
"The Kingdom of Morocco has decided to break its diplomatic relations with the Islamic Republic of Iran beginning this Friday," the ministry said.
Monouchehr Mottaki, Iran's foreign minister, said Morocco's decision was unexpected.
"The action by the Morocco government is surprising and questionable," Mottaki told reporters.
Bahrain controversy
Moroccan local media has repeatedly accused Iran of proselytising in recent years, claims rejected by the Iranian ambassador.
The controversy was fuelled recently by comments attributed to an adviser of Iran's supreme leader which questioned the sovereignty of Bahrain, a Gulf Arab state which has a majority Shia population but is ruled by Sunnis.
Morocco, however, has no official Shia population, with 99 per cent of the country being Sunni Muslim, and the rest either Jews or Christians.
Sunni scholars in Morocco have denounced what they say is an effort to convert people to Shia Islam, arguing that such a practice could ultimately lead to sectarian strife similar to that witnessed in Iraq after the US-led invasion in 2003.
Furthermore, as Mohamed VI, Morocco's king, is the country's official religious leader, any attempt to convert Sunni Muslims has been equated to an attack on the monarchy, the foreign ministry said.
Morocco and Iran have had rocky ties since the Iranian revolution in 1979. The two normalised relations only in the late 1990s.
--
BBC - Friday, 6 March 2009
Morocco cuts relations with Iran
Morocco has cut diplomatic links with Iran, amid a row over comments made by an Iranian politician last week.
Iran's former interior minister Ali Akbar Nateq Nuri said Bahrain used to be Iran's 14th province, and that it still had a seat in Iran's parliament.
Rabat led a chorus of disapproval from Arab states, who interpreted the remark as a claim of sovereignty over Bahrain.
Tehran issued an apology, claiming Mr Ali's comments had been misunderstood and saying it made no claim to Bahrain.
Mr Ali said he was merely making a comparison between the current system of government in Iran and previous systems.
Bahrain is ruled by a Sunni elite, but most of its population is Shia and many have close ties to predominantly Shia Iran.
______________
US disgraced since 1979
--
Shia Crescent always exposed colors of American Presidents.
Iran's Islamic Revolution of 1979 has been repeatedly slapping the White House.
CNN had put this report on its website, but later removed it.
--
Iran Has Knack for Humiliating Presidents
By GEORGE GEDDA - Associated Press Writer. Wednesday 18 June 2003
In debating what to do about Iran, President Bush might consider the outcome of attempts by two predecessors to deal with that country. For both Jimmy Carter and Ronald Reagan, the results were, if not ruinous, something close to it.
Iran might seem like a fitting candidate for the administration to apply its doctrine of pre-emptive action: Iran is thought to be developing nuclear weapons, has an advanced missile program, maintains ties to terrorist groups, possibly including al-Qaida, and is run by conservative mullas who are deeply hostile toward the United States.
The Bush administration is banking on diplomatic pressure to encourage Iran to rethink its nuclear program. It is confident the International Atomic Energy Agency's board of governors, meeting this week, will find Iran to be in violation of its obligations under the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, a step that could put the issue before the U.N. Security Council. Recent disclosures about the Iranian nuclear program seem to have brought Russia and the European Union closer to Washington's position.
It is not clear what the administration has in mind for Iran beyond providing moral support for its broad-based reform movement, weary of a generation of Islamic fundamentalist rule. As some in the administration see it, a hands-off policy is not feasible because, according to estimates, Iran could have nuclear weapons by 2006. This, in, turn, could induce countries such as Saudi Arabia and Egypt to join the nuclear club.
For its part, Iran denies that it has nuclear weapons ambitions. It maintains that its nuclear program is designed solely to generate electricity, thus freeing its oil and gas reserves for export. Few here buy that explanation.
After a generation as a pro-American bulwark in the Persian Gulf, Iran's shift to enemy status following the 1979 revolution may have been the most serious strategic setback for the United States since World War II.
For Carter, Iran was a nightmarish problem from the time the American hostages were taken in Iran on Nov. 4, 1979, until he left office 14 months later. His inability to bring the hostages home cost him dearly in the November 1980 elections. He won six states.
For Carter the low point occurred in April 1980, barely a year after being praised for bringing Israel and Egypt together in a peace treaty. With the hostage crisis in Iran in its sixth month, Carter ordered a rescue operation to be carried out by Delta Force commandoes.
Bad weather at a rendezvous point in Iran called Desert One forced two helicopters to drop out. A third helicopter collided with a fuel-laden C-130 transport plane, killing eight men. The mission was aborted.
Secretary of State Cyrus Vance said it was a ``harebrained'' scheme to begin with and resigned, sparing him the need to defend the operation in the aftermath. As superpower misadventures go, this one ranked with the Bay of Pigs.
Reagan had his own Iran-related disaster. During his second term, he approved the sale of arms to Iran in hopes it would lead to the release of seven American hostages held by Iranian-backed militants in Lebanon. Indeed, three hostages were released, only to be replaced by three others.
It was the darkest period of Reagan's presidency. He had violated not only an embargo on arms sales to Iran but also a promise not to negotiate with terrorists.
Public indignation over the fiasco was compounded when it was disclosed that proceeds from the arms sales were diverted to Nicaraguan anti-communist rebels in violation of a law barring such support.
Unlike Carter, Reagan managed to ride out his Iran-induced headaches, his popularity rebounding before his second term ended in 1989. Now, the question arises: Have the mullahs finally met their match in President Bush? Or will they be able to humiliate yet another American president?
--
Shia Crescent always exposed colors of American Presidents.
Iran's Islamic Revolution of 1979 has been repeatedly slapping the White House.
CNN had put this report on its website, but later removed it.
--
Iran Has Knack for Humiliating Presidents
By GEORGE GEDDA - Associated Press Writer. Wednesday 18 June 2003
In debating what to do about Iran, President Bush might consider the outcome of attempts by two predecessors to deal with that country. For both Jimmy Carter and Ronald Reagan, the results were, if not ruinous, something close to it.
Iran might seem like a fitting candidate for the administration to apply its doctrine of pre-emptive action: Iran is thought to be developing nuclear weapons, has an advanced missile program, maintains ties to terrorist groups, possibly including al-Qaida, and is run by conservative mullas who are deeply hostile toward the United States.
The Bush administration is banking on diplomatic pressure to encourage Iran to rethink its nuclear program. It is confident the International Atomic Energy Agency's board of governors, meeting this week, will find Iran to be in violation of its obligations under the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, a step that could put the issue before the U.N. Security Council. Recent disclosures about the Iranian nuclear program seem to have brought Russia and the European Union closer to Washington's position.
It is not clear what the administration has in mind for Iran beyond providing moral support for its broad-based reform movement, weary of a generation of Islamic fundamentalist rule. As some in the administration see it, a hands-off policy is not feasible because, according to estimates, Iran could have nuclear weapons by 2006. This, in, turn, could induce countries such as Saudi Arabia and Egypt to join the nuclear club.
For its part, Iran denies that it has nuclear weapons ambitions. It maintains that its nuclear program is designed solely to generate electricity, thus freeing its oil and gas reserves for export. Few here buy that explanation.
After a generation as a pro-American bulwark in the Persian Gulf, Iran's shift to enemy status following the 1979 revolution may have been the most serious strategic setback for the United States since World War II.
For Carter, Iran was a nightmarish problem from the time the American hostages were taken in Iran on Nov. 4, 1979, until he left office 14 months later. His inability to bring the hostages home cost him dearly in the November 1980 elections. He won six states.
For Carter the low point occurred in April 1980, barely a year after being praised for bringing Israel and Egypt together in a peace treaty. With the hostage crisis in Iran in its sixth month, Carter ordered a rescue operation to be carried out by Delta Force commandoes.
Bad weather at a rendezvous point in Iran called Desert One forced two helicopters to drop out. A third helicopter collided with a fuel-laden C-130 transport plane, killing eight men. The mission was aborted.
Secretary of State Cyrus Vance said it was a ``harebrained'' scheme to begin with and resigned, sparing him the need to defend the operation in the aftermath. As superpower misadventures go, this one ranked with the Bay of Pigs.
Reagan had his own Iran-related disaster. During his second term, he approved the sale of arms to Iran in hopes it would lead to the release of seven American hostages held by Iranian-backed militants in Lebanon. Indeed, three hostages were released, only to be replaced by three others.
It was the darkest period of Reagan's presidency. He had violated not only an embargo on arms sales to Iran but also a promise not to negotiate with terrorists.
Public indignation over the fiasco was compounded when it was disclosed that proceeds from the arms sales were diverted to Nicaraguan anti-communist rebels in violation of a law barring such support.
Unlike Carter, Reagan managed to ride out his Iran-induced headaches, his popularity rebounding before his second term ended in 1989. Now, the question arises: Have the mullahs finally met their match in President Bush? Or will they be able to humiliate yet another American president?
--
Shia Full Moon
-
News Reports:
[ Influence of the Iranian Revoltion accelerating across the Middle East]
Fear of a Shia full moon - The Guardian
.
The Guardian - 26 January 2007
FEAR OF A SHIA FULL MOON
Events are proving that the king of Jordan was right to warn of a 'Shia crescent' across the Middle East - even though the phrase was a tad undiplomatic, writes Ian Black
By Ian Black
Late in 2004, King Abdullah of Jordan coined a controversial phrase that still resonates powerfully in the Middle East: there was, he argued, a "Shia crescent" that went from Damascus to Tehran, passing through Baghdad, where a Shia-dominated government had taken power and was dictating a sectarian brand of politics that was radiating outwards from Iraq across the whole region.
The king's words were certainly prescient: the divide between Sunni and Shia Muslims looks like being one of the big themes of 2007 as both come to terms with the apparently unstoppable chaos in Iraq, the rise of Iran as a regional power, and the fear of new and catastrophic consequences if the US and/or Israel enter into armed confrontation with the Islamic republic.
Now some scholars are even talking of a new "30 years' war" between the two branches of Islam - something akin to the struggle between Protestants and Catholics in 16th-century Europe.
Some of this deepening anxiety has been evident in comments by the Jordanian monarch in recent days. A journalist from the London-based Sharq al-Awsat newspaper reminded him that officials in Iran were "looking forward to a full Shia moon, not just a Shia crescent." The king responded by stressing that he had never used the word Shia in a sectarian sense - "let's not delve into these labels," he insisted - but rather was referring to "political alignments".
His "Shia crescent" tag went down badly because it was simply too frank; it was simplistic, too, smoothing over local factors of ethnicity and nationalism to provide a single, overarching explanation. In a region where political discourse is often coded, it was highly unusual to hear such blunt language.
But pro-western Jordan is a small, vulnerable, Sunni country, and it has real concerns about the disintegration of Iraq next door. It is already sheltering an estimated 1 million Iraqi refugees and fears many more will flood across the borders if "ethnic cleansing" escalates further.
Protests from Iraq itsellf and from Lebanon were predictable. But there was nervousness in the Gulf, too, where Bahrain has a Shia majority and Kuwait and Saudi Arabia (in its oil-rich eastern province) sizeable Shia minorities.
"It's true to talk of a Shia crescent, but the phrase didn't have a good ring to it," concedes a Jordanian official. The gossip on the diplomatic circuit is that the chief of the country's powerful Mukhabarat intelligence agency, who thought it up, was later sacked because of these adverse reactions.
Jordan, Egypt, Saudi Arabia and the Gulf states have good reason to be anxious. Iran, flaunting its nuclear ambitions, has emerged as the biggest winner of the war in Iraq, and it has a strategic ally in Lebanon's Shia organisation Hizbullah, which triggered last summer's war with Israel. Tehran is also now an influential player in the Palestine question, having forged close ties with the ruling Islamist movement, Hamas.
"Iran should stop seeking to destabilise Palestine, Lebanon and Iraq or any other country so that we can build constructive relations," King Abdullah said. As he put it in another interview, with the Israeli newspaper Ha'aretz: "Through Hamas, Iran has been able to buy itself a seat at the table in talking about the Palestinian issue."
Jordan, perennially caught in the crossfire, is a good vantage point from which to view these multiple and intersecting crises. Until 1958, Iraq was also ruled by the Hashemite dynasty, and the late King Hussein managed to maintain good relations with Saddam Hussein, though he angered his US and British backers by supporting the invasion of Kuwait in 1990.
The kingdom's long exposure to, and involvement in, the Palestinian question has given it a good feel for the intricacies of the conflict with Israel - its own position enhanced by the (domestically unpopular) peace treaty it signed with the Jewish state in 1994.
Jordanians say, wearily, that they do not believe Iran really cares for the fate of the Palestinians, but rather is exploiting the issue for its own ends, complicating the already difficult search for a negotiated solution. The semi-official media has been encouraged to snipe at Tehran along these lines, especially since the execution of Saddam, which was widely seen in Jordan and elsewhere in the Sunni world as an act of pure sectarian vengeance; 22 Jordanian MPs called for a severing of diplomatic relations with Iran.
Iran's assertiveness has reawakened dormant historical resentment. Sunnis now talk routinely of the Safawis - the Arabic name for the Shia Persian Safavid dynasty, which fought the Sunni Ottomans for control of Iraq in the 16th and 17th centuries.
"The current order in Iraq has contributed to opening sectarian wounds throughout the region that most of us thought had been consigned to the past, " commented the Egyptian analyst Amr Elchobaki.
It is natural enough that Jordanians worry about the immediate repercussions of a disintegrating Iraq. But the problem is much bigger than their own immediate neighbourhood.
"We knew that Iraq would be just as complex as it is proving today for the Americans and British, though we are not in the business of saying 'I told you so,'" said a senior Jordanian government figure.
"If the Americans succeed, we will be able to regain Iraq. The extremists want to defeat the Americans at the expense of losing Iraq. If Iraq is divided into two sectarian states, they will be magnets for sectarian war across the Muslim world."
King Abdullah again put it surprisingly bluntly: "If sectarianism deepens and spreads, its destructive effect will reflect on everyone. It will foster division, polarisation and isolationism. Our region will drown in a conflict whose outcome cannot be foreseen."
______________
News Reports:
[ Influence of the Iranian Revoltion accelerating across the Middle East]
Fear of a Shia full moon - The Guardian
.
The Guardian - 26 January 2007
FEAR OF A SHIA FULL MOON
Events are proving that the king of Jordan was right to warn of a 'Shia crescent' across the Middle East - even though the phrase was a tad undiplomatic, writes Ian Black
By Ian Black
Late in 2004, King Abdullah of Jordan coined a controversial phrase that still resonates powerfully in the Middle East: there was, he argued, a "Shia crescent" that went from Damascus to Tehran, passing through Baghdad, where a Shia-dominated government had taken power and was dictating a sectarian brand of politics that was radiating outwards from Iraq across the whole region.
The king's words were certainly prescient: the divide between Sunni and Shia Muslims looks like being one of the big themes of 2007 as both come to terms with the apparently unstoppable chaos in Iraq, the rise of Iran as a regional power, and the fear of new and catastrophic consequences if the US and/or Israel enter into armed confrontation with the Islamic republic.
Now some scholars are even talking of a new "30 years' war" between the two branches of Islam - something akin to the struggle between Protestants and Catholics in 16th-century Europe.
Some of this deepening anxiety has been evident in comments by the Jordanian monarch in recent days. A journalist from the London-based Sharq al-Awsat newspaper reminded him that officials in Iran were "looking forward to a full Shia moon, not just a Shia crescent." The king responded by stressing that he had never used the word Shia in a sectarian sense - "let's not delve into these labels," he insisted - but rather was referring to "political alignments".
His "Shia crescent" tag went down badly because it was simply too frank; it was simplistic, too, smoothing over local factors of ethnicity and nationalism to provide a single, overarching explanation. In a region where political discourse is often coded, it was highly unusual to hear such blunt language.
But pro-western Jordan is a small, vulnerable, Sunni country, and it has real concerns about the disintegration of Iraq next door. It is already sheltering an estimated 1 million Iraqi refugees and fears many more will flood across the borders if "ethnic cleansing" escalates further.
Protests from Iraq itsellf and from Lebanon were predictable. But there was nervousness in the Gulf, too, where Bahrain has a Shia majority and Kuwait and Saudi Arabia (in its oil-rich eastern province) sizeable Shia minorities.
"It's true to talk of a Shia crescent, but the phrase didn't have a good ring to it," concedes a Jordanian official. The gossip on the diplomatic circuit is that the chief of the country's powerful Mukhabarat intelligence agency, who thought it up, was later sacked because of these adverse reactions.
Jordan, Egypt, Saudi Arabia and the Gulf states have good reason to be anxious. Iran, flaunting its nuclear ambitions, has emerged as the biggest winner of the war in Iraq, and it has a strategic ally in Lebanon's Shia organisation Hizbullah, which triggered last summer's war with Israel. Tehran is also now an influential player in the Palestine question, having forged close ties with the ruling Islamist movement, Hamas.
"Iran should stop seeking to destabilise Palestine, Lebanon and Iraq or any other country so that we can build constructive relations," King Abdullah said. As he put it in another interview, with the Israeli newspaper Ha'aretz: "Through Hamas, Iran has been able to buy itself a seat at the table in talking about the Palestinian issue."
Jordan, perennially caught in the crossfire, is a good vantage point from which to view these multiple and intersecting crises. Until 1958, Iraq was also ruled by the Hashemite dynasty, and the late King Hussein managed to maintain good relations with Saddam Hussein, though he angered his US and British backers by supporting the invasion of Kuwait in 1990.
The kingdom's long exposure to, and involvement in, the Palestinian question has given it a good feel for the intricacies of the conflict with Israel - its own position enhanced by the (domestically unpopular) peace treaty it signed with the Jewish state in 1994.
Jordanians say, wearily, that they do not believe Iran really cares for the fate of the Palestinians, but rather is exploiting the issue for its own ends, complicating the already difficult search for a negotiated solution. The semi-official media has been encouraged to snipe at Tehran along these lines, especially since the execution of Saddam, which was widely seen in Jordan and elsewhere in the Sunni world as an act of pure sectarian vengeance; 22 Jordanian MPs called for a severing of diplomatic relations with Iran.
Iran's assertiveness has reawakened dormant historical resentment. Sunnis now talk routinely of the Safawis - the Arabic name for the Shia Persian Safavid dynasty, which fought the Sunni Ottomans for control of Iraq in the 16th and 17th centuries.
"The current order in Iraq has contributed to opening sectarian wounds throughout the region that most of us thought had been consigned to the past, " commented the Egyptian analyst Amr Elchobaki.
It is natural enough that Jordanians worry about the immediate repercussions of a disintegrating Iraq. But the problem is much bigger than their own immediate neighbourhood.
"We knew that Iraq would be just as complex as it is proving today for the Americans and British, though we are not in the business of saying 'I told you so,'" said a senior Jordanian government figure.
"If the Americans succeed, we will be able to regain Iraq. The extremists want to defeat the Americans at the expense of losing Iraq. If Iraq is divided into two sectarian states, they will be magnets for sectarian war across the Muslim world."
King Abdullah again put it surprisingly bluntly: "If sectarianism deepens and spreads, its destructive effect will reflect on everyone. It will foster division, polarisation and isolationism. Our region will drown in a conflict whose outcome cannot be foreseen."
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